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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of LLOYD N. X. JONES, 88-A-7262,
Petitioner,
-againstGEORGE B. ALEXANDER, CHAIRMAN,
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-08-ST9190 Index No. 4719-tizBI

a

Appearances :

Lloyd N. X. Jones,
Inmate No.88-A-7262
Petitioner, Pro Se
Elmira Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 500
1879 Davis Street
Elmira New York, 14902-0500
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Rcspondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(C. Harris Dague,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

Georgc U. Cmsia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on October 23,
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2007 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving concurrent
terms of fifteen years to life for attempted murder in the first degree (two counts), fifteen
years to life for kidnaping in the first degree (two counts), and a term of eight years to life
for burglary in the second degree. The petitioner has been denied parole three times
previously. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the
respondent failed to follow the statutory guidelines for parole determination set out in
Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A). He mentions that two of his disciplinary determinations
were reversed and expunged. He indicates that he has made plans to be reunited with his
children and grandchildren upon being released. In the petitioner’s view, the Parole Board
ignored his accomplishments while incarcerated. The petitioner asserts that the Parole
Board’s determination, in not releasing him, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution He also maintains that the twenty-four month hold was excessive
and unnecessary.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“P;irole de n i d Your instant offense, Attempt& Murder 1
Kidnaping lst,Burglary 2”dwas committed while you were on
Federal Supervision for Bank Robbery,. You also incurred a
prior out of state conviction for attempted armed robbery.
St,

“You have maintained a clean disciplinary record since your last
parole board appearance.
“This panel notes your positive programmatic participation
including completion of ART and RSAT as well as your
continued productive work as a group leader. Following
deliberation, this decision is based on review of the case record
as well 2s the interview with parole board members.’’
2
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As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinor>oliv New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau v.

Hamma&. 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermoret only a “showing of irrationality

bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention

(see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting

Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence
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of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
by the Parole Board

(see

Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
While the Court is mindful of the recent decision in Matter of Vaello v Parole Board
(48 AD3d 1018 [3d Dept., 2008]), the Court is also aware ofthe decision in Matter of Silvero
v Dennison (28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 2006). In Vaello, the inmate’s petition was granted,
and the parole determination reversed, by reason that it was not apparent that the Parole
Board considered any of the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law 0 2594. In Silvero,
the Court held that the failure of the Parole Board to recite the precise statutory language of
the first sentence of Executive Law

0 2594 (2) (c) (A) to support its conclusion does not

undermine its determination, so long as the underlying statutory criteria were considered
(Silvero, supra, at 859-860). In this instance, in addition to mentioning the crimes for which
the petitioner was convicted, the Parole Board also noted his clean disciplinary record, his
positive programing, and his relationship with staff and other inmates (specifically with
respect to being a group leader). A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals
ihi

aite~iiioriwas

paid to such factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his clean

disciplinary record, and his plans upon release.
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law g259-i (see Matter of
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept.,
19941; Matter of Green v. hew k ork btate Uivision of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept.,
1993j). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of
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the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division
of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State
Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, Puma; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd
Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The

Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
Executive Law tj 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to

undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 8259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Pctitioner’s claims that the determination to dwy parole is tantaiiiount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit
5
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Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961;Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
DePartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3rdDept.,
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).

With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates

of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law 9 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlemerrt to, or a legitimate
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; m h e j
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,13671368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russo v hew k'ork State Bd. ofYarole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76,
SUUILL,Matter 01

bamez v Dennison, 18 AU3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v
6
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New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court,
accordingly, finds no due process violation.
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
DecisiodurdedJudgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

ENTER
Dated:

December / 7 ,2008
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.
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Papers Considered:
1.
2.

3.

Order To Show Cause dated July 8,2008, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated August 28,2008 , Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Petitioner’s Reply Brief dated September 24,2008, With Attachments
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